The Business of Blast Fishing

“A look into the industries that allow blast fishing to continue in the Philippines”

By Mar Guidote, Jojo dela Victoria and P/Sr. Insp. Nonie Poliquit

Editor’s Note: Part 1 and Part 2 of this article first appeared on this web site in January 2001 and February 2001, respectively.

Part 3. The terrorism connection

Twenty-two people died and more than 100 others, including women and children, were injured in explosions on December 30, 2000 in five separate locations in Metro Manila. Confessed terrorist leader Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, an Indonesian national with alleged links to the terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), revealed under police interrogation that the blasting caps used in the bombings were bought from Cebu.

Al-Ghozi’s accomplice, Cusain Ramos alias “Alex” or “Abu Ali”, who was arrested in General Santos City in southern Philippines in late 2002, claimed a certain Antonio Reyes from the village of Tangke, Talisay City in Cebu Province supplied the detonators. Ramos said the JI had two transactions with Reyes, the group’s Cebu contact since 1986. The first transaction was for Manila targets and the other for Singapore targets. In November 2000, Reyes supplied the group with 50 boxes of explosives weighing more than one ton, six rolls of detonating cord and three boxes of blasting caps. 

The contrabands were shipped in motorboats from Cebu to a drop-off point in northern Mindanao, where, according to police intelligence experts, they were transported by land through rebel-infested routes. This explains how the bombs used in Manila appeared to have originated in General Santos City, although the supply originally came from Cebu.

After more than a year in hiding, Reyes was arrested by the Vice Control Section of the Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Branch of Cebu City Police and charged with violations of Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866 which provides penalties for the unlawful manufacture, sale or possession of explosives.

Reyes denied all the charges but admitted knowing Ramos. He was released after posting a bail of Php200,000 pesos (about US$3,400 at USD1:Php55).

Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi escaped from prison and was killed in a police shootout in October 2003. Cusain Ramos was enrolled in the government’s witness protection program.

Local firearms experts believe that blasting cap manufacturers and traders know their products are being used for illegal activities, but they rarely make a distinction between buyers with ‘legitimate’ purposes and those engaged in dubious activities. Some may be unwittingly dealing with terrorist groups and rebels.

Rebel groups have minimal use for blasting caps in the combat zone, where they employ more powerful mortars and explosives, but they have found ample application for blasting caps and the primary dynamite ingredients, nitrates, in public scare operations – for example, in bombing important installations and populated areas, also the preferred scare tactic of terrorist groups. At the very least, as authorities now know, in November 2000, JI operatives acquired – quite easily, it seems – nitrates and blasting caps from a Talisay City supplier, and used these to sow terror in Metro Manila one month later. 

Part 4. Putting the lid on the illegal trade

FPA bans solid nitrates
The spate of bombings with the use of nitrate-based explosives in the Philippines and neighboring countries compelled the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) to take more stringent measures against the importation of nitrates.

In October 2002, after the Bali bombing that killed more than 200 people, the Indonesian police furnished the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) a report describing how bomb makers who assisted the terrorists in Indonesia were exchanging information with their Philippine counterparts in the island of Mindanao on the use of nitrates as bomb ingredients. In the report, Indonesian authorities explained how gold miners from Tatellu near the town of Manado in Sulawesi have been in close contact with some Filipino miners in southern Philippines. Two of the arrested accomplices of the Bali bombers were former miners of Tatellu.

In response to the terror attacks in the Philippines and Indonesia, the FPA Board of Directors imposed a total ban on the importation of agricultural-grade ammonium nitrate in solid form. The ban took effect in November 2002.

In a letter to the Coastal Resource Management Project (CRMP), which earlier provided the FPA with a copy of the first two parts of this article(see Part 1 and Part 2, the FPA director said the move “was done since the said chemical is being used as an ingredient in the manufacture of …homemade bombs and explosives... However it may be pointed out that the industrial grade being used by licensed ammonium manufacturers is not covered by aforesaid circular since it is under the jurisdiction of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police (PNP). ”

The responsibility for enforcing the FPA Resolution falls on the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), the Bureau of Customs (BoC), the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) and the PNP Maritime Police. These agencies are tasked to ensure that agricultural-grade nitrates in solid form do not enter the country.

A month after the order was issued, a second explosion rocked the village of Pook in Talisay, creating a meter-deep crater, as if to send a message of defiance to the local government.

In November 2003, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-National Environmental Action Team (IBP-NEAT) and the Coastal Law Enforcement Alliance in Region 7 (CLEAR7) met with Talisay City government officials to discuss the group’s plan to stamp out the underground trade. The group also held a series of meetings and dialogues with the PNP, Philippine Navy, PCG, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and village leaders.

In one dialogue involving confessed dynamite users and the local government, participants confirmed that the villages of Pook, Tangke, San Roque, Gimbal, Biasong and Cansojong are the havens of blasting cap making in Talisay City. Pook residents said Tangke is the main the source of blasting caps, an allegation that Tangke residents rejected. All agreed, however, that the village of Pook is the manufacturing center for canisters.

During the meetings, the discussions centered on the blasting cap makers’ demand for the local government to provide them with an “alternative” source of income that was at least as profitable as their current business.

In response, the local government of Talisay and the IBP-NEAT requested CRMP to provide technical assistance in developing a livelihood scheme. CRMP pooled experts from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA), Ramon Aboitiz Foundation, Inc (RAFI), Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Department of Agriculture-Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (DA-BFAR) and the Mactan Channel Multi-Sectoral Management Council. These organizations jointly packaged a proposal, which DENR and a senator agreed to fund through a Php600,000 (US$ 10,800) grant.

The economic incentive
In two focus group discussions (FGD) conducted by CRMP, IBP-NEAT and the Talisay local government with 27 confessed dynamite fishers, participants denied having firsthand knowledge of where blasting caps are made and traded. Nevertheless, some participants intimated they were willing to give specific information in exchange for police protection, free legal counsel and livelihood. They said they would be risking their lives if they revealed the identity and whereabouts of manufacturers and traders – unintentionally supporting reports that the illegal manufacture and trading of blasting caps continue, and debunking their village chiefs’ claims that key players in the business are either dead or already in jail.

Equally disturbing was the seeming boldness of some of the respondents to admit violating the law without remorse because “the government cannot provide an alternative livelihood that would provide us an income that is bigger than what we earn from dynamiting.” They claimed to have tried at least one government-initiated livelihood program but went back to blast fishing, because it was “more profitable.” Unless the government comes up with an acceptable economic formula, they said, they would continue to engage in blast fishing and refuse to cooperate in the government’s effort to stop the illegal blasting cap trade.

No substantive information or direct or immediate leads to suppressing the manufacture and trade of blasting caps were generated from the FGDs, but enough details were collected to contribute to a deeper understanding of the underground trade, and possibly, what it would take to stop it. Respondents claimed, for example, that the cost of dynamite has increased 100 percent from three years ago. An 8-oz bottle of ammonium nitrate costs Php30, 1 liter Php50, and 1gallon Php500. Blasting caps sell for Php20 a pair, compared to Php10 in 2001, when Part 1 of this article was written.

The price increase may be the result of any number of factors – stricter regulations, an increase in the price of solid ammonium nitrate in the world market, or simply, a general perception that explosive materials cannot be traded as openly as three years ago. What is clearer is that, in the respondents’ view, demand for dynamite and blasting caps has not been affected by the price increase; it seems the underground market has its own way of adjusting to inflation.

While blast fishers can directly relate the loss of fish in their “traditional dynamiting grounds” with their use of dynamite and worry about the continuing increase in the price of blasting caps, they believe there is justification for blast fishing, which they regard as their only hope for survival. From this narrow perspective, they see nitrate suppliers and blasting cap makers contributing more to their economic well-being than the government.

Just how far can the demand for explosive materials go? Some respondents hint at a possible threshold: Five years ago, they said, an 8-oz bottle of explosives guaranteed at least 5 kilos of fish, and 1 liter provided 10 kilos or more. These days, blast fishers have to go farther out to sea and require help from “spotters” (divers employed to spot schools of fish) to get the same amount. This means the catch must be divided among more people, translating into a deep cut in each fisher’s income. Ultimately, the loss of income may be substantial enough to render the use of explosives in fishing unprofitable – and hopefully finally put a stop to the business of blast fishing.

Conclusion. The elusive solution

Both the national government and the local government recognize that the illegal manufacture and trade of nitrates and blasting caps have implications beyond Talisay City’s borders, beyond fisheries, and indeed beyond national security. Socio-cultural, economic and political factors make the solution particularly elusive, so efforts to stamp out the illegal nitrate and blasting cap business must necessarily address interconnected social, economic and political issues.

The government may want consider doing an in-depth research and analysis of possible courses of action to combat the problem, as well as their socio-economic and political impacts. An understanding of the players and how the trading in Talisay City is conducted could be a first step.

Field research conducted by CLEAR7 and inputs from FGDs reveals a hierarchy in the Talisay blasting cap trade: the manufacturers occupy the top layer, and below them are the traders, then the skilled workers and further down the ladder, the unskilled workers (Fig. 1).

Click image to zoom

Blasting cap trade in the Philippines
A manufacturer can either be a capitalist (one who finances production) or a manager (one who operates the assembly line). Capitalists most often are also the managers except in certain cases where a “retired” manager merely finances some operations. Manufacturers invest large sums of money to procure nitrates and fuses, pay laborers and sometimes finance deliveries.

Traders may be either a merchandiser/dealer or a retailer. Mechandisers buy blasting caps in bulk (wholesale) and transport them to retailers. Retailers get their supply from the merchandisers; merchandisers buy from the manufacturers.

Below the traders are the skilled workers, who fall under two categories, depending on their skills: the canister makers (craftsmen) and the chemical mixers (chemists).

Occupying the bottom layer are the unskilled workers – baggers, packers and small-time peddlers. Baggers and packers are employed only when there are large orders to ensure that blasting caps are safely packaged for transport; small-time peddlers sell blasting caps by piece. According to sources, many of the small-time peddlers are children of the workers.

These two approaches are widely different, and no one agency can effectively undertake both of them.

 “Soft” enforcement may be applied to market players lower down the hierarchy. The canister makers and chemists must be trained to transfer their skills to a legal industry that uses the same or closely- related materials. The baggers, packers and peddlers may have skills applicable to handicrafts, running convenience stores and a wider variety of options that DSWD, TESTA, DA, DENR, DOST and other agencies can determine.

But for this to happen, enforcement agencies should first focus heavily on the players that occupy the highest layers of the hierarchy, who make it possible for the business to persist. “Hard” enforcement must be employed on the manufacturers and traders, who are not easily convinced to comply with the law through dialogue or an offer of alternative livelihood. These players must be identified and tried with illegal manufacture, transport and/or possession of explosives, smuggling, tax evasion, engaging in business without permit, exploitation of minors and the like. The police, coast guard, navy, NBI, Bureau of Internal Revenue, BOC, DOJ, DSWD, Department of Labor and Employment and PPA could look into possible collaborative arrangements for enforcement.

Without the manufacturers to provide capital for raw materials and without the traders to sell raw materials and finished products, there will be no supply in the market in spite of the demand. Getting these two players off the market is the primary goal, because it will effectively cut the flow of blasting caps from a major source to blast fishers – as well as terrorist groups and anyone who threaten public safety.

In the long term, with strict, consistent and sustained enforcement, anyone who plans to venture into the blasting cap trade must weigh the promise of profits against their buyers’ willingness to buy and the degree of risk posed by increased detection.

And what of the blast fisher himself?

Hard enforcement in general will “force” the fisher to comply with the requirements of the law for fear of sanctions but this can also be tempered with another hard enforcement strategy geared towards “encouraging” him to comply with the law. While directing all efforts to suppress the supply of blasting caps may actually solve the problem of blast fishing across the country because it “pushes” concerned actors to comply, enforcers must also conduct a parallel hard enforcement strategy to pull blast fishers away from their illegal practice in the event that the problem persists or re-emerges in the future.

One such parallel strategy is to address the rampant intrusion of commercial fishing inside the 15-kilometers of municipal waters. Commercial fishing vessels intruding in municipal waters and commandeering prized species give small fishers justification to use dynamite to get their “fair share” of the marine life that is morally and legally reserved for their use. Getting these vessels out of the restricted 15-km zone and at the same time addressing the blasting cap trade will give blast fishers no excuse or opportunity to gain public sympathy, and no logical explanation for using dynamite in a bountiful sea.

Coordinator of the Coastal Law Enforcement Alliance in Region 7 (CLEAR7), an initiative of law enforcement agencies in Region 7 supported by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Executive Director of the Cebu City Bantay Dagat Commission (CCBDC) and the National President of the Philippine National Association of Fish Wardens (PHILNAF).

Chief of the Firearms and Explosive Division of the Philippine National Police Regional Office in Central Visayas

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